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## THE DOCTRINE OR THE LEAGUE

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WE may now regard the scheme of a League of Nations as fully and finally disclosed in its perfected form. It must be so, since it has been presented to the United States Senate for adoption, and has already been adopted by some other countries. It was not, it is true, in such form at the beginning. Between the original suggestions of Mr. Taft with his "League to Enforce Peace" and of Mr. Wilson with his "General Association of the Nations" in his Fourteen Commandments, and the "Constitution of a League of Nations," which was put forward in advance of the Treaty of Peace, there was a vast difference. The suggestions were confessedly tentative. The Constitution was professedly definitive. The President was so well satisfied with what he had received from General Smuts that he declared it insusceptible of amendment, save perhaps for a little verbal rearrangement which he himself would perform. Nevertheless, because of the temperate and benevolent observations of some of those pygmy minds that he so greatly loathed, he presently knocked the whole thing galley west and remade it in radically different form; and between the "Covenant" thus produced and the former "Constitution" there was a difference even greater than that between the "Constitution" and the primary suggestions.

But the Covenant has been turned in as finished work; signed, sealed, and delivered. There can be no more changes

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in it for the sake of trading or any other purpose. Thus we may regard it as a finality, presented for judgment, and properly to be compared with its one great exemplar, the Holy Alliance of a century ago. In instituting such comparison we shall find an extraordinary and an instructive analogy, in circumstances, in manner, and in matter.

Each of the two was formed at the close of what was down to that time the greatest war in history. It was formed because of that war, because of a weariness of war, because of a desire for peace that should be secure against a recurrence of such war. Each represented reaction against war. Each purposed to prevent war and to enforce peace.

Each arose, however, not spontaneously from a general popular demand, but from the private councils and machinations of a few statesmen or chiefs of state. That was notoriously true of the Holy Alliance. It was scarcely less true of the League of Nations. Mr. Taft's "League to Enforce Peace" had indeed some popular vogue, yet even it was a device of the few and not a demand of the many, and the majority of those who at the beginning enrolled themselves in it had no thought of any such thing as that into which that organization was presently merged. The Holy Alliance was scarcely more exclusively the work of the three reactionary sovereigns than the League of Nations was the artificial creation of three doctrinaire statesmen.

Each was in profession singularly pure and lofty; and indeed their professed aims were substantially identical. It was ostensibly to promote love, righteousness and peace among the nations that the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia made their famous compact. It was to promote those same causes that General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil and President Wilson put forward the League of Nations.

Each was advocated sincerely—by at least some of the foremost protagonists. Despite the cynicism of some historians, we can see no more reason for questioning the sincerity of Czar Alexander than that of President Wilson himself. Doubtless each was mistaken, as a self-opinionated doctrinaire is likely often to be. But mistakes do not denote insincerity; and in the one case the error was no greater than in the other.

In each case, moreover, the primary aim of the organization was presently subordinated to what had been a sec-

ondary aim, and the latter was made dominant over all. And this at first secondary but presently paramount aim was in each case the analogue of that in the other. The Holy Alliance ostensibly aimed, as we have said, at love, righteousness, and peace. In fact, its chief object was to some extent to maintain the *status quo*, and to some extent to restore the *status quo ante bellum*. The ostensible aim of the League of Nations was to promote love, righteousness and peace among the nations. In fact it soon appeared that its chief purpose was to maintain the *status quo*. We have been told again and again by a variety of authorities on both sides of the sea that that is the case. The crux of the whole business, they have assured us, is the provision which binds the United States to be the common bailiff of the world, to protect the territorial integrity of every other member of the League.

Each of the two, moreover, sought to impose the will of the few upon the mass of the many. Each was to be essentially an oligarchy. Under the Holy Alliance there was a Big Three. Under the League of Nations there was to be a Big Five. In each case the small cabal was to dominate the whole, though such oligarchical domination was, it must be confessed, not nearly as marked under the Alliance as under the League, perhaps because the former contained no one chief of state quite so imperious and autocratic as did the latter.

Each met with vigorous resistance and opposition, and it is of peculiar pertinence to note that this opposition arose chiefly in the United States, and that with it in each case the Monroe Doctrine was intimately and essentially associated. It was promptly recognized in each case that the movement was inimical to American interests, and especially to that interest of nationality which is of all dearest to every true American heart. When this menace was presented by the Holy Alliance, the United States promptly responded with an act of defence and defiance as unmistakable as the "They shall not pass!" at Verdun. It took the form of the Monroe Doctrine. That Doctrine was framed and launched against the Holy Alliance, and it destroyed it. It is a coincidence so singular as to stagger belief in the mere operation of chance that the League of Nations should conspicuously attempt to destroy that Doctrine in return.

This is the exposition of the case: The Holy Alliance could not stand, because the Monroe Doctrine rose against it, and the Alliance was not strong enough to destroy the Doctrine. The League of Nations could not hope for success as long as the Monroe Doctrine stood, wherefore its first thought was to strike that Doctrine down.

Thus far the analogy is one of the most complete that the history of the world contains, and one of the most suggestive. The crucial point has now been reached. It is to be seen whether the parallel between the two organizations, the Alliance and the League, is to be continued to the end, or whether there is to be a radical reversal—whether the League is to succeed where the Alliance failed, in its insidious but no less malign attack upon the integrity and tranquillity of the United States of America.

### AS IN WAR, SO IN PEACE

THE often-quoted epigram of Milton in his address to Cromwell may prove to be the most pertinent suggestion and the most needed lesson for the world to-day and in the days to come:

. . . "Peace hath her victories,  
No less renowned than war."

Perhaps we should paraphrase it, and say that peace has her duties no less important and no less imperative than those of war, and, in fact, not altogether different from them.

We are reminded of this by the somewhat characteristic tendency of Americans to go to extremes in regarding the war as ended, and therefore all war conditions and practices as no longer necessary but as to be forthwith abandoned and indeed reversed. To a certain extent, of course, this should be done. In some respects it should have been done more promptly and more fully than it has been. The extraordinary and autocratic powers with which the President was invested; governmental control of and interference with many private enterprises and businesses; burdensome war taxes, and various other similar things which had no possible excuse for ever existing save as necessities in the emergency of a war for which we were unprepared,

—all these should certainly be swept into eternal limbo at the earliest possible moment and in the completest possible manner. It is an abomination to retain such war conditions in time of peace.

There are, however, many other things which have at least been brought into prominence during the war and because of the war, which it would be lamentable for us now to relinquish. They were indeed war measures enacted to meet war conditions. But that fact is a strong reproach of the nation for not having adopted them long ago in times of peace, while it is of course not the slightest reason for not now continuing them in time of peace.

A very practical example is seen in the so-called Daylight Saving law, which some misguided men have been seeking to have abolished. It was adopted as a war measure, though it had been proposed and urged long before as an economic measure in peace. It doubtless contributed to the winning of the war, if in no other way through its immense saving of expense. But it should be obvious that such saving of expense, not to mention probable benefit to physical health, is just as desirable in peace as in war; especially since it is secured without effort and without the slightest hardship. As we have observed before, it is doubtful if ever so great an economic good was secured so simply and easily, at so little cost, and with so little interference with the ordinary activities of individuals and of society. To renounce it now, simply because it was regarded as a war measure and therefore not to be maintained in time of peace, would be crass and inexcusable folly.

The same may be said of many of the habits and practices of thrift which were imposed upon us as war measures, but which commend themselves to us for permanent use. We are glad, of course, to be rid of war bread, and sugarless tables, and heatless days, and gasoline-less Sundays, and all such odious privations. We bore them cheerfully enough in war-time, largely as penalties of our unpreparedness and inefficiency; but we should revolt against their continuation in time of peace. But because we get rid of them is no reason in the world for our forsaking practices of rational economy, in the avoidance of waste and in the fuller utilization of resources and supplies.

We are rid of war bread, or wheatless bread; but we should not therefore throw good loaves or half-loaves into the garbage can. We are done with gasoline-less Sundays, but we should not therefore waste the fluid by letting engines race while standing still or by slushing it around for washing purposes. We need no more to plow up our lawns for potato patches, but neither should we let good farming land lie unimproved. This country has long had and has deserved the reproach of wastefulness. We have enjoyed such plenty of supplies that economy in their use has seemed unnecessary. Well, plenty is a legitimate source of pride; but it can never be a justification of waste. We are done with war privations, but it would be regrettable if we should abandon our war time thrift.

On another plane, no less practical and even material, yet also more spiritual, are matters of benevolence, of humanity, of charity, and of fraternal helpfulness. Never before, we suppose, in the history of the world, was there such an outpouring of benevolence or were there such works of mercy and of charity done, as during these last four years. The activities of the Red Cross, of the Y. M. C. A. and kindred organizations, of the Salvation Army, and of many similar agencies of relief and blessing, as well as of innumerable individuals, crowd with inspiring annals some of the noblest chapters in all the record of human-kindness. Now those things were directed to the succor of the sufferers from war's ravages, and to promoting the welfare of those who were waging the war. In that sense they were purely wartime agencies. There will hereafter be no call for putting forth such extraordinary exertions, for there will be no such extraordinary needs to meet. But surely that should be the most compelling of reasons for our so maintaining those activities in times of peace as to meet adequately their lesser yet no less urgent needs. "The world is filled with sorrow and sin," in peace as well as in war; and we should wonder at and should not envy nor admire the man who would give freely to relieve the sufferings caused by war and should refuse similar compassion to the perhaps fewer but often no less poignant sufferings which occur in peace, and just as much without the sufferers' fault. These agencies of good which have been so superbly efficient during the war would stultify themselves if they fell into desuetude now that peace has come. Or perhaps we should

say that we should stultify ourselves if we permitted them thus to lapse.

We may add as eminently desirable for maintenance in peace as in war what we may describe as the community spirit, or the spirit of unity. This has prevailed during the war in a most gratifying degree. Men and women of all political parties and of all religious faiths have laid aside their differences in the pursuit of a common end, and have worked together with fine cordiality. They have seemed to realize that there was something more important than the exploitation of their individual idiosyncrasies, something which was equally important and equally dear to them all, of whatever party or faith, and something therefore for which they could all strive without in the least abandoning their own special principles and creeds. Now that was quite true. To win the war and to save the nation and humanity were more important objects than to promote the advantage of this party or the growth of that church. But he would be strangely short-sighted who could not perceive just as important objects now, and just as strong reasons for similar unity of effort. The welfare of the nation and of humanity is still to be served, in peace as in war, and there is just as much need of unity of purpose in serving it. If it were not so, what would be the inevitable inference? Why, that a state of war was preferable to a state of peace, since the former aroused a degree of civic virtue and devotion which the latter did not arouse. Surely we are not prepared to concede that.

We must mention also the need of maintaining in times of peace the educational standards which have been insisted upon in the stress of war. It was found that our national system of education was permeated by an alien and a hostile propaganda. Text books contained and teachers taught deliberate and intentional untruths, some intended to influence us in favor of some foreign nation and some to prejudice us unjustly against some other nation. The history of our own country was grossly perverted. The teaching of robust American patriotism was shamefully neglected. Many of these conditions, though by no means all, were corrected, some through laudably strenuous means. Our public and private educational systems have because of the war become far more truthful, far more efficient, far more American. It would be an atrocity to let



them relapse by so much as a single hair's breadth toward the old status. There must never be any more preference of a foreign language over English in an American school, never any more "Vaterland" textbooks, never any more Scott Nearings and Hugo Muensterbergs in our colleges. The "freedom of teaching" in America does not embrace the teaching of Bolshevism and "Kultur". And we have also, it is to be hoped, learned for permanent application the lesson of the question which Socrates tells us he put to the son of Hipponicus: "Callias, if your two sons had happened to be two colts or two calves, we should be able to get and to hire for them an overseer who would make them excellent in the kind of excellence proper to them; and he would be a horse-trainer or husbandman. But now, since they are two human beings, whom have you in mind to get as overseer? Who has knowledge of that kind of excellence, that of a man and a citizen?" We have learned in war and we must practice it in peace, that it is as essential to educate our youth as American citizens as it is to train them to practice law or to play baseball.

It would be an unpardonable lapse, moreover, if we were to forget in peace all that we have learned in war about the need of constant and universal preparedness to meet any demands which may be made upon us for the welfare of the nation. Already the voice of the Pacifist is again heard in the land, uttering that which a little time ago would rightly have been deemed sedition. The gospel of anti-preparedness is being preached, with all its fallacies and falsehoods. We are being told that it is wicked to train our boys to be strong, because then they may fight and hurt somebody, and that the way to prevent fighting is to keep all so weak that they cannot hurt one another. The duty of peace is to suppress such treason with no uncertain or hesitant hand. Half the war burdens that we have suffered, half the lives that were lost on the fields of France, were due directly to our miserable and treasonable state of unpreparedness. God pity us, if we are such fools as to forget the lesson!

Above all, for indeed it comprehends all, is the need of insisting upon one hundred per cent Americanism, unhyphenated and undiluted. It was, if we remember aright, sturdy Captain Coghlan, of Manila Bay and "Hoch, der Kaiser!" fame who first applied the name and denounced

the thing of "hyphenated Americans." Long may his memory endure, and forever may the truth which he inculcated prevail throughout the land which he loved and served so well! His warning was given to us after a little war, in a time of profound peace, and therefore was foolishly neglected. It has been revived and re-emphasized amid the stress of the world's mightiest war, and its emphasis now ought to endure even amid the blandishments of peace. It ought, we say; but it will not if Americans do not strenuously insist upon it, and inexorably reject every insidious proposal which is made from no matter how exalted or autocratic a source for its impairment. The latest and most pernicious assault upon one hundred per cent Americanism is not so much individual as collective. It is proposed not that citizens shall be hyphenated or have their Americanism diluted, but that the nation as a whole shall do so. We are asked to abjure nationality for internationalism. We are asked to become not an integral sovereignty but a vulgar fraction of a League. We are asked to renounce our war time devotion to the principle of national independence for the bastard pacifist heresy of international dependence.

We do not want war. We do not want war conditions continued. But we do not want the fruits of victory in war to be sacrificed. If we fought the late war, as some insist, for our own interest, that interest was, the object of our fighting and of our unspeakable sacrifices was, that this nation should remain an independent, sovereign nation, unravaged by Huns, unmixed in European feuds, self-reliant, self-contained. We did not fight that we might be made an appanage of alien Powers or be enmeshed in all the webs of intrigue and whelmed in all the maelstroms of war that might occur even at the uttermost ends of the earth. If, as some maintain, we fought the war for the sake of humanity, to "make the world safe for democracy," then certainly we did not fight to subject the world to an oligarchy and to invest some Big Five, or Four, or Three, with power to tyrannize over all lesser nations. We seem to remember that the war began in the attempt of two great Powers to crush two small nations, and that others joined in to prevent that crime and to establish the right of small states equally with great Powers to the maintenance of treaties and all their rights under international law. If

those are the things that we fought for in war, they are the things that we must maintain in peace. It may, it will, require a struggle to do so, comparable—so far as peace is comparable with war—with the struggle by means of which we won those things in war.

“ . . . Peace hath her victories,  
No less renowned than war,”

and it may be that the victory in peace over the League of Denationalization will be no less renowned and no less important to this nation and to the world, than our militant victory in war over the spirit of autocracy.